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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper investigates the channels through which macroeconomic instability prevents or hinders 
innovative investment undertakings financed by the domestic business sector. The analysis is based 
on a sample of 48 countries, representing all levels of development, and uses various measures of 
macroeconomic instability, such as political, real and monetary volatility. The results suggest a 
negative impact of macroeconomic instability on the share of R&D financed by the domestic 
business sector. These outcomes highlight the desirability of counter-cyclical policy interventions 
aiming to prevent the avoidance or abandonment of private R&D undertakings in unstable 
macroeconomic environments. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Innovation, in both its public and private component, is the ‘engine’ of modern growth. As such, its 
progress is key to economic development.  Nonetheless, the summary statistics of the R&D data 
used in this analysis appear to suggest some counterintuitive evidence in this respect.  With few 
exceptions, in developed countries, the share of public R&D spending is lower than (or just as big 
as) the private share; however, in developing countries, (often very) low levels of business R&D 
are almost always accompanied by relatively higher levels of government R&D investment.1  
 
 [Table 1 about here] 
 
This evidence inevitably raises the question of why the domestic private sector in developing 
countries refrains from engaging in high-returns R&D investment projects. We try and answer this 
question in what follows by focusing on a core component of R&D returns, that is, macroeconomic 
stability. In particular, we ask whether the domestic private sector refrains from R&D undertakings 
because they are too risky in uncertain macroeconomic environments such as the ones that 
characterise most developing countries. We do so while bearing in mind two extrinsic 
characteristics of R&D investment. First, innovation is a risky, long-term-maturity, high-budget 
type of investment, and, as such, it is likely to be largely influenced by uncertainty in the 
surrounding macroeconomic environment. Second, small and medium-sized firms, particularly in 
developing countries, are likely to be credit constrained, especially during recessionary spells. 
                                            
1
 China, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Africa, Uruguay and Venezuela constitute somewhat of an 
exception. 
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While a number of studies have dealt with the implications of macroeconomic volatility2 on private 
investment, with sometime conflicting results (Hartman, 1972; Abel, 1983; Dehn, 2000; Pindyck 
and Solimano, 1993; Bernanke, 1980; Federer, 1993; Serven, 2003, Aghion et al., 2010), only a 
few more recent papers have looked specifically into the link between macro-instability and 
innovative private investment (Aghion and Saint-Paul, 1998; Goel and Ram, 1999; Saint-Paul, 
2003; Rafferty, 2003a; Barlevy, 2005; Aghion et al., 2008; Rafferty and Funk, 2008; Bohva-Padilla 
et al., 2009). Most importantly, part of the aforementioned contributions is theoretical in nature. 
Those which are empiric follow a microeconometric approach, utilising firm-level data and/or 
focusing on OECD countries only. Such focus is motivated by the well-known scarcity of R&D 
data availability for developing countries (Goel and Ram, 1999; Aghion et al., 2010; Agénor and 
Neanidis, 2011). As a result, a comprehensive analysis that adopts a macroeconometric approach 
and considers developing countries as well as developed countries does not exist to the author’s 
knowledge, which is what this paper seeks to do in what follows.  
 
The contribution of this paper is not, however, limited to the novel empirical focus. It also extends 
to the mixed dataset, which has been constructed by integrating private sector R&D expenditure 
data from various sources and databases.3 And it includes the estimation of a multi-dimensional set 
of volatility indices. Specifically, to represent the multiple aspects in which instability of the 
macroeconomic environment manifests itself, we utilise a number of proxies for real, monetary and 
political instability. It is shown that they all have a negative impact on private innovation 
incentives. In addition to this, we also disentangle the individual effect that each one of these 
components has when all volatility indices are estimated at the same time. These findings qualify 
                                            
2
 Uncertainty and volatility are technically defined as two different concepts. However, it is common to find 
them used interchangeably in the literature and we will follow this convention hereafter. 
3
 Details of the dataset composition process are presented in Section 2 below. 
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the mixed results reported in the literature, on one hand. On the other hand, in light of the 
considerations previously exposed, they uncover the necessity of public policy interventions in 
support of private firms engaging in innovation in volatile macro-environments. Such interventions 
should aim at preventing the abandonment or avoidance of private R&D investment undertakings 
as a consequence of macro-uncertainty; so as to allow for continuity in private profitability 
horizons and, as a result, in national growth and development paths. 
     
    The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 outlines the theoretical background; section 3 
presents methodological considerations, together with the variables and the data. The results along 
with the robustness analysis are described in section 4 and 5. Section 6 illustrates some policy 
implications and concludes. Finally, the data sources, the country list and some additional 
methodology appear in Appendix A and B. 
  
2. BACKGROUND 
 
        The theoretical literature on uncertainty and investment can be broadly divided into two 
strands. Some studies describe the relationship between these two variables as positive (Hartman, 
1972; Abel, 1983; Dehn, 2000; Pindyck and Solimano,1993). Others posit that tighter credit 
constraints during recessions and the irreversibility of most investment projects - especially of 
innovative investment - turn this relationship negative (Bernanke, 1980; Federer, 1993; Goel and 
Ram, 1999; Aghion et al., 2010).4 In particular, Bernanke (1980) argues that a range of inaction is 
                                            
4
 Uncertainty is defined as an increase in the variance of future return forecasts. The latter will be higher 
when the future maturity horizon of an investment is long and/or when it is uncertain, which is particularly 
the case in R&D investments. Furthermore, investing in the proximity of the technological frontier requires 
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created in the presence of uncertainty, and that investment will not be undertaken until the moment 
when the cost of postponing it exceeds the value of the information gained by waiting. In addition, 
Goel and Ram (1999) show that the ‘degree’ of irreversibility of an investment project can change 
the impact of uncertainty: they find a much larger adverse effect on R&D investments, which are 
likely to be highly irreversible, than on non-R&D ones. In this sense, they argue that R&D 
investment entails expenditure on personnel, equipment and materials that is largely irreversible, 
owing to its project-specific and not merely firm-specific or industry-specific nature. This implies 
that it will be much more difficult, if not impossible, to dispose of the variable and fixed capital 
acquired in order to carry out a specific R&D project, in the face of adversities. Aghion et al. 
(2010) find that, when credit markets are imperfect and liquidity constraints are tight enough, long-
term investment will tend to be pro-cyclical.5  
 
       A more recent number of contributions analyze the impact of volatility on ‘innovative’ 
investment. This literature can again be divided into two main strands, depending on whether they 
maintain that R&D investment follows a pro-cyclical or counter-cyclical response pattern to 
macroeconomic fluctuations. It is crucial for policy-makers to determine which one holds.  In fact, 
as put forward in Blackburn (1999), if business cycles increase inventive activity, a policy attempt 
to smooth out the business cycle might reduce productivity growth and long-run growth. But if 
business cycles decrease inventive activity, then attempts to smooth out the business cycles can 
improve productivity growth and long-run growth. Those that argue in favor of a pro-cyclical 
response pattern maintain that a ‘cash-flow’ effect exists, which financially constrains firms’ 
activities and hinders the undertaking of innovative investment during downturns (Rafferty, 2003a; 
                                                                                                                                            
plenty of funds and firms worry equally about probability of success and size of the investment (Canitrot, in 
Katz, 1987). 
5 The authors explicitly identify R&D investment as a long-term type of investment. 
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Rafferty and Funk, 2008; Aghion et al., 2008; Bohva-Padilla et al., 2009, Aghion et al., 2010). 
Barlevy (2005) adds to this that, although credit constraints certainly account for part of the pro-
cyclicality, knowledge spillover effects play their part too. In particular, diffusion and 
implementation by imitators tends to takes place during recessions when the time to reverse 
engineer the spllied-over idea before the next boom is longer. Therefore, private innovators will 
refrain from incurring spillover risks and will tend to invest in R&D during booms instead. Those 
that support the counter-cyclicality of R&D investment suggest that downturns influence resource 
allocation at the firm level according to ‘opportunity-cost’ criteria (see Saint-Paul, 1993). 
Specifically, recessions lower expected sales. As a consequence, the opportunity cost of 
undertaking R&D activities in terms of foregone profits, is lowered as well. Therefore, firms will 
find it profitable to allocate resources to R&D during recessions and to the shop-floor during 
expansions. This approach is informed by the Schumpeterian view of the business cycle and by 
Hall’s reorganizational capital theory (1991). According to both, recessions have a cleansing role 
as they encourage firms to restructure, replace and innovate. In this respect, however, Aghion and 
Saint-Paul (1998) specify that such set-up will only hold when productivity enhancing investment 
is costly but this cost does not hinder current production activities. In fact, when the costs are 
higher and may disrupt current production, pro-cyclicality holds instead. Furthermore, Aghion et al. 
(2008) and Rafferty and Funk (2008) show that the existence of an asymmetry in binding 
constraints causes cash-flow constraints to bind more during recessions than expansions. This 
results in firms’ R&D disinvestment during recessions being greater than their increase in R&D 
investment during expansions. Likewise, the ‘opportunity-cost’ effect is shown to bind more during 
booms than slumps. As a result, firms will tend to relocate resources away from R&D and towards 
the productive compartment when positive demand shocks occur, but the opposite is unlikely to 
happen (to the same extent), during negative demand shocks.  Relying on the same methodology 
used by Aghion et al. (2008), Bohva-Padilla et al. (2009) additionally prove that both pro-
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cyclicality and counter-cyclicality of R&D are confirmed. The first, however, is more likely to hold 
for small and medium-sized firms, which tend to experience binding credit constraints the most; 
whereas, the second characterises non-credit constrained firms, such as MNCs or subsidised firms. 
It follows, therefore, that for small and/or credit-constrained firms, as well as for all enterprises 
exposed to the negative impact of downturns, counter-cyclical mechanisms need to be in place in 
order to maintain their incentive to innovate.  
   
3. MODEL AND DATA 
 
The econometric analysis aims to test the various claims made in the literature, as to the direction 
and size of the impact that macro-volatility has on private R&D investment. The choice of 
regressors included in the model specification has taken into account and sought comparison with a 
variety of stability/instability indicators used in the literature, and with various control variables 
which have been used by the literature on the determinants of innovative investment. The dataset 
has been constructed by merging various databases reporting measures of business R&D for both 
developed and developing countries (OECD STI, UNESCO S&T, RICYT – see Appendix A for 
details). 6 As a result, our panel covers 15 years, from 1994 to 2008, and 66 countries, so that the 
maximum sample includes 956 observations. Due to missing data, however, the actual estimated 
panel is reduced to 48 countries and 288 observations. Sub-Saharan African countries, excluding 
                                            
6
 Correspondence of measurement units has been ensured and discrepancies have been solved prior to the 
dataset merge. This has been achieved by making sure the overlapping sections of the various databases were 
rebased in the currency denomination year of the one that contained the most variables. Moreover, the unit of 
measurement has been homogenized across the various sources and million dollars have been used as the 
base unit. Finally, where data discrepancies were encountered, the formally identical data definition has been 
explored in detail to subtract the components which made measures different in practice.  
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Uganda and South Africa, do not collect secondary data on innovation at all. Therefore, the panel 
suffers from an underrepresentation of African countries that needs to be acknowledged. All the 
sources used for the collection of the dataset and the country list are shown in Appendix A.  
 
The benchmark econometric specification is as follows: 
 
 
(1) 
 
where the dependent variable, yit, is BusinessR&D, the share of investment in R&D financed by the 
domestic business sector, calculated as a % of GDP. The right hand side of the regression includes 
a vector of time-invariant country fixed effects, αi, a vector of time-varying common effects, δt,, 
and the error component εit. The Xj,it-2 and Ζl,it vectors contain, respectively, lagged endogenous 
control variables and exogenous control variables in levels. Finally, the vector of Vm,it is formed by 
volatility measures, the impact of which is the object of this analysis.  
 
Starting with the endogenous controls, Xj,it-2 contains the share of publicly financed R&D, 
GoverR&D. This is included to account for the role of public tangible and intangible infrastructure 
and to verify whether its impact on private R&D spending has a complementary or a crowding out 
effect. As public and private R&D can be co-determined, GoverR&Dt-2 enters the regression in the 
form of its second lag; which serves to correct for the potential endogeneity bias on its coefficient. 
The same applies to all the other variables contained in Xj,it-2. The other variables included in this 
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vector
 
are LogGDPt-2, that is, GDP per capita (in logs), and its interaction with the dummy HI.7 
This takes the value of 1 if the country is a high-income country, according to the World Bank 
Atlas classification system, and zero otherwise.8 GDP per capita is included to control for the level 
of development of the countries in our panel. Its interaction term, LogGDPhit-2, on the other hand, 
has been included to control for the possible non-linearity of the relationship between the level of 
development of an economy and its private innovative spending.9  
 
        The Zl,it vector contains exogenous control variables The real interest rate, IntRate10is 
routinely used as a determinant of investment in the literature (Rafferty, 2003b; Aghion et al., 
2008; Rafferty and Funk, 2008; Bohva-Padilla et al., 2009; Becker and Pain, 2003; 
Escaleras&Thomakos, 2008). The type of interest rate considered is the lending interest rate 
charged to businesses by commercial banks, with a maturity of 3 months to 1 year. The choice of 
this type of interest rate over the short term rate (1 month to 3 months) or long term rate (around 10 
years) aims to target medium-term investment decision dynamics. A measure of trade openness 
(TradeOpen), calculated as the sum of exports and imports as a % of GDP, is also included. We 
expect this variable to have an impact related to the contribution of international exchange to the 
                                            
7
 The relevance of human capital and educational levels for the innovation process has been highlighted by 
both theory (Lucas, 1988; Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992; Acemoglu and Zilibotti, 2001) and empirics 
(Wang, 2010). The reason why such a variable is excluded from our analysis is due to its high correlation 
with GDP. 
8
 The list of HI countries is available in Appendix A 
9 This hypothesis of a non-linear pattern is confirmed by a visual inspection of the data in our sample and by 
a plot of LogGDPt-2 against BusinessR&D. In particular, the plot suggests that the positive effect of the level 
of development on private innovation sets in after a certain income threshold and only exists in HI countries.  
10
 Its square, IntRateSq, is also included to capture potential non-linear effects. 
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ease and pace of innovation and technological progress. This variable has been included in 
previous studies and tested as one amongst the most relevant determinants of innovative investment 
(Smolny, 2003; Sameti et al., 2010).  Finally, this vector also contains ExchRate, the nominal 
exchange rate level, together with the interaction between the latter and an EMU dummy, which 
takes the value of one only for those countries which joined the European Monetary Union (EMU), 
in the year they switched currency regime. The level variable is meant to take into account the 
impact of a currency appreciation/depreciation, which would be brought about by changes in export 
and/or import capacities. The interaction, instead, controls for the structural break taking place 
when the EMU regime is adopted, by correcting for the switch in measurement units.11 
 
        Finally, theVm,it vector contains various measures of volatility that cover and proxy for all 
aspects of macroeconomic instability. They represent indicators of volatility associated with real, 
monetary, and political variables proxying for the overall soundness of the macroeconomic 
environment. Specifically, the Vm,it vector contains: a measure of overall government 
deficit/surplus, named Balance. Balance proxies for the quality of public account management. 
While, strictly speaking, this does not represent a coefficient of instability, it does give a measure 
of fiscal reliability, and it has been used in other studies in the same way (Burnside and Dollar, 
2000; Fisher, 1993). In other words, the way a government keeps its finances, accumulates its debt 
load, and maintains the manageability of its budget are all indicators of the soundness and 
reliability of its policies. PolInstab is an indicator of political and institutional stability named 
‘State Fragility Index’ in the Polity IV database. The index is constructed as a weighted average of 
                                            
11
 Most EMU countries joined the currency union in 1999; the rest of the EMU countries in our sample have 
joined the union between 2001 and 2007. When the switch takes place LCU denominated exchange rates turn 
to euro denominations, therefore the EMU dummy is needed to take into account the break and to avoid 
biasing the estimation. 
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various political legitimacy and economic effectiveness indicators. In particular, its score is higher 
for countries where the occurrence of wars, coups d’état and short-lasting political regimes is more 
frequent. The rationale for including a measure of political stability relates to the likelihood with 
which a political regime change influences the macroeconomic environment as a whole, by 
switching policy, tax and incentive regimes, and by shifting around economic targets and priorities 
at the national level (Fosu, 1992; Alesina et al., 1996). Also, more so in developing countries where 
this happens rather openly, corruption and rent-seeking behaviors influence the allocation of 
resources (Alesina et al., 1996): if the group/coalition in power changes, the whole network of 
interactions, resource allocation and power relations can change, thereby bringing an abrupt 
alteration in investment profitability and opportunities. The vector also includes ad hoc measures of 
real and monetary volatility, which have been constructed using the coefficient of variation of real 
interest rate (IntRateCoV), exchange rate (ExchRateCoV), and GDP per capita (LogGDPCoV). The 
volatility of the interest rate, along with that of the exchange rate, is used to proxy for the volatility 
of the monetary policy framework. Moreover, the volatility of the exchange rate is also used to 
proxy for the level of international volatility. In particular, this is meant to capture the fact that a 
great part of the innovation performed in developing countries is not sold domestically. Once again, 
the interaction between the volatility of the nominal exchange rate and the EMU dummy 
(ExchRateCoVEmu) controls for the structural break induced by the European Union membership, 
as explained in the above section. In this case, however, the interaction is used to measure and 
account for the increased stability that the introduction of the common currency regime has 
introduced in the nominal exchange rate levels of the EMU countries. Finally, the volatility of GDP 
per capita is intended to proxy for the instability in the real sector of the economy. In other words, 
the coefficient on this volatility index measures the variability in the level of overall savings and 
aggregate demand.  
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        A great part of the literature agrees on the coefficient of variation (C.o.V.) being a more robust 
indicator with respect to the standard deviation (SD); as not only the latter is an absolute measure, 
but it also is very sensitive to noise in the data (see Mobarak, 2005; Klomp & de Haan, 2009). To 
the contrary, the division by the mean implied by the C.o.V. creates a discounted relative measure, 
which allows to take into account co-movements between similar countries, due for example to the 
effect of common business cycle patterns (Klomp & de Haan, 2009).12 Nonetheless, there is still 
much controversy as to which of the two measures is more appropriate when different variable 
specifications are used. For this reason, we test the CoV results’ robustness using the SD. 
 
        Macroeconomic volatility does not enter the regression specification in lagged form because it 
is extremely unlikely that such a small component of GDP such as innovative investment financed 
by the private sector can cause real, monetary, and/or political instability, as measured by the CoV 
of the variables reported above.13 All the other variables are divided, as already said, in endogenous 
and exogenous ones. Just to reiterate, for the former, their own second lag has been used as a way 
of instrumentation. This choice has been made both in the simple Fixed Effects (FE) model, which 
we estimate first, and in the 2SLS-FE model, which constitutes our chosen estimation technique. In 
the next section, the results of the simple FE panel are followed by those of the 2SLS-FE panel, in 
order to compare the gains in terms of unbiasedness achieved by means of the second technique. 
To be more specific, the FE model only deals with time invariant country specific fixed effects and, 
in that context, we take care of the endogeneity of the Xj,it-2 vector variables by lagging all the 
variable contained in that vector. In the 2SLS-FE panel, instead, the advantages of the fixed effects 
methodology are coupled with a different instrumentation technique. The latter is structured in two 
stages of estimation and the entire set of exogenous (or internal) instruments is used to proxy for 
                                            
12
 Appendix B contains technical details on the construction of these volatility measures.  
13 The average private R&D spending in our sample is just about 0.7% of GDP (see Table 1) 
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the whole set of endogenous variables. At the same time all the exogenous variables in vector Zl,it  
are used as instruments for themselves (external instruments). 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
 The benchmark regression reported in equation (1) is estimated in its basic, more parsimonious, 
form first and then in its extended form when all volatility indices are included. The results of the 
FE estimator are reported in Table 2, while the results of the 2SLS - FE estimator appear in Table 
3. We start with column (1) of Table 2, which reports the results of the most basic regression 
specification estimated, that includes: GDP per capita and its HI interaction, public R&D, the 
interest rate and its square, the exchange rate and its EMU interaction, trade openness and budget 
deficit. Subsequently, as we move to the next columns, real volatility, monetary volatility and 
political instability indices are added one at a time in each set of results; this is done in order to 
examine their individual as well as their joint effect on private innovative spending. Column (5) 
appears in bold type because it reports our benchmark regression specification as detailed in 
equation (1). 
 
[Table 2 about here]  
 
As we can see in Table 2, the non-interacted level of development is never significant, regardless of 
the regression specification being estimated, whereas LogGDPhit-2 takes on the expected positive 
sign. One possible interpretation of this result is that the level of a country’s economic development 
is relevant when explaining private innovate investment only after a certain threshold value of GDP 
per capita. GoverR&Dt-2 also has a positive sign and retains its high significance throughout the 
estimation set, a result which points in the direction of a complementary rather than a crowding out 
14 
 
effect of public R&D. This result confirms the findings of Becker and Pain (2003) and Sameti et al. 
(2010). The real interest rate shows a negative but diminishing effect on innovative investment. 
This is to be expected if the interest rate is taken to represent the cost of borrowing capital by 
private enterprises. The level of the nominal exchange rate as well as its interaction with the EMU 
dummy are never significant, and equally insignificant turns out to be the volatility of the exchange 
rate and the interaction term of the latter with EMU, as shown in column (4) and (5). The degree of 
openness to trade has a positive and significant impact on BusinessR&D at the 10% level. This 
result is in line with both the empirical literature (Smolny, 2003; Sameti et al., 2010; Wang, 2010) 
and the theoretical literature (Porter, 1990; Lundvall, 1992; Nelson, 1993) that show how 
international openness is likely to result in a positive impact on technological progress, due to 
increased external exposure and interaction. Turning to the examination of the instability 
indicators, Balance has a very highly significant positive impact on BusinessR&D. The magnitude 
of this impact increases further as we move from left to right in the table. We can interpret this 
coefficient to signify that in our panel there is evidence of a positive relationship between improved 
fiscal performance and innovative investment. Moving our attention now to the CoV macro-
volatility indices, column (2) reports the results of the inclusion of real volatility only. 
LogGDPCoV enters the regression with a negative sign, as expected, and an absolute coefficient of 
0.1, which actually increases in both significance and magnitude as more volatility indices get 
added and reaches 0.18 in column (5). A sizably lower but still very significant and negative impact 
is born by the monetary volatility index and by the political instability index.14All these results 
remain substantially the same when endogeneity is taken into account, via the use of 2SLS with 
fixed effects (Table 3).  
 
                                            
14
 A quantitative interpretation of the C.o.V. indices is given in the next paragraph, when the results of the 
2SLS-FE preferred estimation technique are described. 
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[Table 3 about here] 
 
In fact, the lack of significance of the estimate on LogGDPt-2 carries over to this analysis, as well as 
the very strong positive impact that the level of development has on private R&D spending when 
interacted with HI. The one result that is cconsiderably different from the simple FE set of results is 
the coefficient of GoverR&Dt-2, which from about 0.2 in Table 2 reaches a coefficient of 0.82 in the 
benchmark regression specification in column (5). This indicates that a 0.5% increase public R&D 
will lead to a 0.41% increase in private R&D spending, which is quite high, considering that the 
average private R&D spending in our sample is just about 0.7% of GDP (see Table 1). The impact 
of the interest rate and that of the exchange rate and its interaction with EMU carry over from Table 
2. The same stands for the impact of ExchRateCoV and its interaction term ExchRateEMU. Note 
that the lack of significance of such variables in our sample is reflected in the literature; where 
much of the evidence on the relationship between exchange rate regimes and export volumes is 
rather inconclusive (see Wang and Barrett, 2007 for a review). TradeOpen, on the other hand, 
appears to have again a quite substantial positive impact on private innovation. In our panel, 0.5% 
increase in trade openness, measured as the sum of exports and imports over total GDP, leads to a 
0.11% increase in BusinessR&D. The coefficient of Balance, once again, confirms the importance 
of the quality of the macroeconomic environment for innovative undertakings by the private sector. 
The estimates of the 2SLS model suggest that a 1% increase in surplus (or decrease in deficit) leads 
to a 0.02% increase in innovation spending. It is easier to appreciate the magnitude of this impact if 
one considers that the value of BusinessR&D in our sample ranges between a minimum of 
0.000028% and a maximum of 3.40% of GDP (Table 1). With regards to the volatility measures,  
the increase in one standard deviation of the real volatility CoV results in a decrease of about 0.2% 
points in private R&D spending. In the case of monetary volatility, as proxied by the CoV of the 
real interest rate, one standard deviation increase in the CoV of IntRateCoV leads to a decrease of 
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0.012% points in BusinessR&D. These results are in line with the microeconometric literature 
reported above (Rafferty, 2003a; Aghion et al., 2008; Rafferty and Funk, 2008; Bohva-Padilla et 
al., 2009), which finds a negative impact of both real and monetary volatility on R&D spending. 
Finally, PolInstab, also appears with a very similar coefficient to the one estimated using simple 
FE. That is, a 1 point increase in political instability, as measured by the Polity IV “State Failure 
Index”, leads to a 0.027% decrease in BusinessR&D. This type of relationship is in line with the 
results of Barro (1991), Fosu (1992), Alesina et al. (1996), and Fosu (2003). Our results also reflect 
the arguments put forward by Rodrik (1989) and by Fanelli and Frenkel (1995), who warn that the 
biggest risk implied by political instability lays in its recurrence and persistence, which leads 
economic agents to change expectations and behaviors as a response. In particular, Rodrik (1989) 
shows that uncertainty on policy stability acts as a tax on investment. In fact, expectations are 
based on both the subjective probability attached to policy reversal and on the magnitude of 
investment irreversibility. The former is very high in developing countries, while the latter is very 
high for R&D investment. This combination is therefore likely to be the cause of the detrimental 
impact that political instability has on BusinessR&D in our findings. 
 
        It has to be emphasised that all volatility measures, with the exception of the exchange rate 
volatility index, appear in the result set with robustly negative coefficients, regardless of whether 
they are tested on their own or jointly. Indeed, their magnitude increases with the inclusion of 
additional volatility indices and controls. Furthermore, they retain their significance across the 
different estimation techniques and regression specification sets, despite the inclusion of time 
controls, which are used to correct for the effect of both common shocks and the business cycle.15 
 
                                            
15
 Also note that LogGDPCoV is the volatility of the log of GDP per capita, and not of GDP per capita in 
levels. However, even with this specification, the effect of real volatility is highly significant. 
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4. ROBUSTNESS ANALYSIS 
 
In order to check the robustness of these findings, we, firstly, test the same model of the benchmark 
regression in column (5) of Table 3 using the standard deviation as an indicator of volatility rather 
than the coefficient of variation. Secondly, we include a number of additional controls to the 
benchmark model, and, finally, we restrict the sample to a set of high-income countries, so as to 
examine the differential impact that volatility has on the amount of private spending in R&D, 
conditional on a higher level of economic development. This is done because higher levels of 
economic development are likely to be also reflected in lower financial constraints, more developed 
financial markets and better ability of the private sector to cope with volatility and recessions, or 
even its capacity to benefit from such fluctuations. As anticipated, the latter hypothesis has been 
put forward by part of the literature reported above (Hartman, 1972; Abel,1983; Hall, 1991; Saint 
Paul, 1993 Hall, 1991; Pindyck and Solimano,1993; Saint-Paul, 1993; Dehn, 2000). This 
hypothesis is supported by our own panel’s results.  
 
        Starting with the model where the SD has been substituted to the CoV, we are going to focus 
on column (1) of Table 4 first.  
 
[Table 4 about here] 
 
The results show now that both LogGDPt-2 and LogGDPhit-2 are significant, albeit of different sign, 
pointing in the direction of a negative effect of very low levels of development on innovative 
investment by the private sector. All the results previously reported with regards to public R&D, 
the interest rate and its square, exchange rate levels and their EMU interaction term, trade openness 
and balance remain intact. When real, monetary and international volatility are measured with the 
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SD, all three measures are significant. In fact, the exchange rate level gains significance, although 
this result cannot be considered as robust. In addition, the finding seems to be counter-intuitive as it 
suggests that a depreciation will decrease innovative investment.16 This can be interpreted to 
represent the import-intensive nature of innovation in developing countries. In other words, lower 
purchasing power of a developing country’s currency will result in decreased capital good and 
input imports. This will in turn lead to lower innovative investment. Both LogGDPStDev and 
IntRateStDev, instead, retain their significance and negative relationship with private R&D 
spending, even though the magnitude of both volatility coefficients is now smaller when compared 
to the results of column (5) in Table 3. Finally, the index of Political Instability retains its 
significance and appears with a slightly increased coefficient magnitude. 
 
        Moving now to column (2) of Table 4, we present the set of results deriving from the inclusion 
of a number of additional regressors. Democracy is taken from the same Polity IV dataset from 
which PolInstab is taken. This indicator attaches a score of 10 to very democratic countries and 0 
to autocratic regimes. This control is meant to proxy for the quality of institutions; however, it 
appears to be insignificantly different from zero. Such result could be a sign of political instability 
being a more important determinant of investors’ confidence and willingness to fund innovation 
projects than the quality of the institutional background. A measure of property rights protection is 
also included; which is an index constructed by Economic Freedom of the World (EFW). This 
control is added to test whether physical and intellectual property right security has any impact on 
the amount of innovative investment undertaken by the business sector. The insignificance of this 
measure is debatable; nonetheless it confirms Wang’s (2010) results in his analysis of the 
                                            
16
 For evidence of a negative impact of exchange rate volatility on agricultural productivity, see Barrett et al. 
(2006). For evidence of a positive relation between exchange rate volatility and overall fixed investment, see 
Escaleras and Thomakos (2008).  
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determinants of fixed investment. Finally, a variable measuring the amount of high-tech exports as 
a %GDP has also been included. This variable has been instrumented with its second lag to account 
for its likely endogeneity. Once again this control appears with an insignificant coefficient in 
column (2). It does not, however, alter all other volatility indices and control variables. In fact, it is 
possible to see in column (2) of Table 4 that the volatility measures’ significance and their 
magnitude have actually increased following the inclusion of these new regressors.  
 
         Finally, column (3) reports the results of the benchmark regression estimated on a panel of 
OECD economies. This reduced panel covers a longer period: 28 years, from 1981 to 2008, it 
counts 22 countries and sums up to 321 observations. As anticipated, this is done in order to 
estimate the impact of volatility conditional on the different development level attained by this 
high-income group of countries. An additional implication of this test is that it allows to assess 
whether the type of production landscape - and especially the size of the enterprises forming this 
landscape - influences the impact that volatility has on the share of domestic private R&D 
spending. Such hypothesis has been tested by part of the previously reported literature (Rafferty 
and Funk, 2008; Aghion et al., 2008; Bohva-Padilla et al., 2009), and the results shown in Column 
(3) are in line with both the main findings of this literature and with the strand of literature that 
posits the pro-cyclicality of innovative investment (see Saint-Paul, 2003). In particular, the positive 
coefficient exhibited by real volatility, LogGDPCoV, lends some evidence to the arguments 
inscribed in the Schumpeterian creative destruction theoretical framework. The monetary volatility 
index, represented by IntRateCoV, retains its negative impact. The positive sign exhibited by the 
levels of real interest rate, instead, seems puzzling at first sight. However, in light of the fact that 
this panel is very homogeneous and that in developed countries the risk attached to investment is 
much lower, this result can be interpreted to represent the rate of return on investment projects. A 
new indicator of political instability, Xconst, measures the degree of constraints put on the 
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executive at the institutional level.17 It attaches a higher score to more democratic countries, where 
the executive power is limited by other authorities and a score of zero to autocratic regimes. 
Because both the degree of democracy and the institutional background setting are broadly 
homogenous among all countries contained in this HI panel, the coefficient on this variable turns 
out to be insignificant. A result which is likely to be due to the lack of variation in the data. Some 
similar considerations can be made with regards to the level of development. In fact, the coefficient 
of LogGDPt-2 appears to be non-significantly different from zero. This result is again probably 
attributable to the fact that there is very little variation in the level of personal income in the 
countries contained in this sample. An interesting result is the fact that, even in this sample, the 
amount of public R&D spending financed by the government retains a positive impact on 
BusinessR&D. TradeOpen has not been included in this regression due to the fact that all high-
income countries in this panel are internationally open to the same degree. Balance, on the other 
hand, turns insignificant, which is likely to be due to the higher confidence investors place in public 
finances of developed countries. The level of ExchRate now has a positive impact on 
BusinessR&D. While its coefficient is not very high in economic terms, its significance lends mild 
evidence to the familiar dynamic whereby export expansions follow currency depreciations (see 
Wang and Barrett, 2007, for a similar argument).  
 
5. POLICY IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
This paper has sought to study the impact of macroeconomic instability on private innovative 
investment in the form of R&D. The innovation of the paper has been threefold. Firstly, a 
                                            
17
 PolInstab could not be used in this regression due to the different time coverage of the HI sub-sample. As 
already mentioned, the HI panel starts in 1981, whereas the ‘State Fragility Index’ by Polity IV only covers 
the years from 1994 onwards. 
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comprehensive mixed developed-developing economies panel has been constructed and a 
macroeconometric approach has been adopted. Secondly, various indices of real, monetary, and 
political instability have been tested according to various econometric and economic specifications. 
Their negative impact on private R&D spending has been shown to be not only robust, but also 
insensitive to the inclusion of additional controls and to changes in the measurement procedure. 
Thirdly, the macro-instability indices retain their significance both when tested individually and 
when tested jointly, allowing us in this way to disentangle the individual effect of each of the 
various macro-instability components. 
 
        It has been argued that lack of private R&D investment is likely to result in low levels of 
growth and development. The question of why the domestic private sector of developing countries 
is neglecting innovation, and therefore failing to reap the high-returns of this type of investment 
activity, has been asked at the outset. Innovation has been classified as a high-budget, long maturity 
horizon type of investment. Due to these features, uncertainty of the macroeconomic environment 
has been suggested as a potential answer for the lack of private R&D investment engagement 
exhibited by most developing countries in our sample.  As mentioned above, the econometric 
findings reported in this paper support such hypothesis and suggest three ways in which macro-
volatility can affect R&D investment. In particular, political instability, real volatility and monetary 
volatility are shown to have a negative impact on the share of R&D financed by the domestic 
business sector in a mixed panel of 48 countries. Subsequently, it has also been shown that, when 
the same estimation is performed on a sample of high-income countries, only monetary volatility 
retains a negative impact, while the coefficient of the real volatility measure is positive and signals 
the presence of creative destruction effects in our sample.  
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        The above results highlight the need for counter-cyclical policy interventions aiming to 
prevent the avoidance or abandonment of R&D investment by developing countries’ domestic 
firms. Vidal (2008) reports in her study of the entrepreneurial sector in Latin American countries 
that half of the businesses in the region fails to survive the set-up phase, and shows how 
abandonment of investment projects is as important a problem as the avoidance of investment 
altogether. Moreover, Rodrik (1989) shows in his calculations that when investment irreversibility 
amounts to three-quarters of the cost of installed capital, a 20% investment reversal probability due 
to instability calls for a 15% point public investment subsidy. The latter is needed to offset the 
losses due to uncertainty and it is necessary to keep alive both the investment profitability and the 
incentive to innovate. In conclusion, a policy implication which is possible to draw from this study 
is that if avoidance and/or abandonment of innovative projects are to be prevented in the face of 
uncertainty, policy interventions should follow a counter-cyclical pattern. In other words, they 
should aim at smoothing out downturns and at providing complementary infrastructure, R&D 
spending and innovation subsidies to firms when negative shocks hit. This would guarantee a 
continuity of cash flows and return opportunities over time to firms engaging in innovation in 
unstable macroeconomic environments. 
 
 
 
APPENDIX A 
 
I. DATA SOURCES 
BUSINESS R&D 
Share of total R&D spending (%) financed 
by the private sector  
 
 
OECD.Stat Main Science and 
Technology Incidators (MSTI - 2010) 
UNESCO UIS Science&Technology 
(S&T - 2010) 
Red Indicadores Ciencias 
YTecnologia (RICYT - 2009) 
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GOVERNMENT R&D 
Share of total R&D spending (%) financed 
by the public sector 
  OECD.Stat MSTI Database (2010) 
UNESCO UIS (2010) 
RICYT (2009) 
 
GDP PER CAPITA 
 
GDP/midyear population. Data are in 
constant 2000 US$ 
 
   World Bank-WDI (2010) 
 
INFLATION RATE Rate of Inflation (CPI based) 
 
IMF - International Financial Series 
(IFS, 2010) 
 
 
REAL INTEREST RATE 
 
Lending Interest Rate minus Inflation Rate 
 
WDI and IMF’s IFS series--Author’s               
calculation 
OFFICIAL EXCHANGE 
RATE 
Exchange Rate value (LCU per US$) 
 
World Bank-WDI (2010) 
IMF - International Financial Series 
(IFS, 2010) 
BALANCE  Overall Deficit/Surlpus (%GDP) 
IMF – Government Financial 
Statistics (GFS, 2009) 
EXPORTS/IMPORTS 
 
Trade (% GDP) 
 
    
World Bank-WDI (2010) 
OECD National Account Stats (2010) 
DEMOCRACY 
I 
ndex of Democracy that takes the value of 
10 for very democratic countries and 0 
when the institutions are very authoritarian 
 
   POLITY IV Dataset (2010) 
STATE FRAGILITY  
INDEX 
Index based on state legitimacy, political 
instability and economic effectiveness. It 
takes the value of 21 for very unstable 
political environments and 0 for very 
stable ones 
 
POLITY IV Dataset (2009) 
 
XCONST 
 
Institutional Constraints on the Executive. 
It takes the value of 7 for countries where 
 
POLITY IV Dataset (2010) 
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the power of the executive is constrained 
by institutional mechanisms and 0 when 
the government is very authoritarian 
 
HIGH-TECH EXPORTS 
 
Share of High-Tech exports over GDP 
 
World Bank-WDI (2010) 
 
PROPERTY RIGHTS 
PROTECTION INDEX 
Indicator of enforcement of property rights 
protection. It takes the value of 1 when 
property rights are very well protected and 
7 when security of property rights is not 
ensured 
 
Economic Freedom of the  World 
(2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
II. COUNTRY LIST 
Argentina Denmark** Israel** Norway** South Africa 
Australia** Estonia* Italy ** Panama Spain** 
Austria** Finland ** Korea Rep.** Paraguay Sweden** 
Belgium** France** Kuwait Philippines Switzwerland** 
Bolivia Germany** Latvia* Poland* Thailand 
Brazil Greece** Lithuania Portugal** Uganda 
Bulgaria Hungary* Malaysia Romania Ukraine 
Canada** Iceland** Malta* Russia United Kingdom** 
China 
Colombia 
Cyprus* 
Czech Rep* 
India 
Iran 
Ireland** 
 
Mexico 
Mongolia 
Netherlands** 
 
Singapore* 
Slovak Rep* 
Slovenia* 
 
United States** 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
*High-Income countries (according to the ATLAS classification system) 
** OECD economies included in the robustness analysis panel 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX B 
 
The Coefficient of Variation (C.o.V.) is calculated across a two year rolling window; its measure is 
defined as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of the rolling window. A backward 
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looking strategy has been used18 to reflect the type of knowledge agents might have of volatility at 
time t, which is attained by comparing the volatility levels prevailed at time t-1 with those of time t. 
The standard deviation is calculated according to the following formula:   
 
                                                          (1) 
 
Whereas the C.o.V. is obtained as: 
 
 
 
Where σ is the standard deviation as defined in (1) and µ is the mean calculated across a two-year 
rolling window. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
VARIABLE MEAN ST. DEV. MIN MAX OBS. 
BUSINESSR&D 0.674    0.7     0.000028  3.40 585 
GOVERR&D 0.45      0.25   0.02   1.18 542 
GDPPC
 
12525  11632 193.5 56639 811 
GDPPCHI 11030 12382 2271.3 56639 811 
INTRATE 9.7 12.7 0.128 130.7 680 
EXCHRATE 288 985.7 0.03 11786 815 
BALANCE 
  -0.88 4 -21.5 23.4 578 
TRADEOPEN 0.9 0.62 0.15 4.38 803 
POLINSTABILITY 4.7 5.2 0 21 741 
LOGGDPCOV 0.3 0.26 0.0002 2.79 812 
INTRATECOV 0.52 2.2 0.0005 45.9 675 
EXCHRATECOV 0.06 0.09 0 0.84 815 
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Table 2. 
     FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LOGGDPt-2 -0.21 
(0.18) 
-0.21 
(0.18) 
-0.088 
(0.19) 
-0.09 
(0.2) 
-0.3 
(0.23) 
LOGGDPHIt-2 0.59*** 
(0.18) 
0.52*** 
(0.18) 
0.45** 
(0.2) 
0.44** 
(0.21) 
0.52** 
(0.21) 
GOVERR&Dt-2 0.21** 
(0.11) 
0.22* 
(0.11) 
0.23** 
(0.11) 
0.24** 
(0.12) 
0.24** 
(0.12) 
INTRATE -0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
-0.007** 
(0.002) 
-0.007*** 
(0.002) 
INTRATE2 0.00005* 
(0.00003) 
0.00006** 
(0.00003) 
0.00008** 
(0.00002) 
0.00007** 
(0.00003) 
0.00007** 
(0.00003) 
EXCHRATE - 0.0001 
(0.00008) 
- 0.00008 
(0.00008) 
- 0.00008 
(0.00008) 
-0.00007 
(0.00008) 
-0.00007 
(0.00008) 
EXCHRATEEMU - 0.02 
(0.03) 
- 0.03 
(0.03) 
- 0.02 
(0.03) 
-0.026 
(0.043) 
-0.018 
(0.043) 
TRADEOPEN 0.1 
(0.08) 
0.13* 
(0.08) 
0.14* 
(0.08) 
0.183* 
(0.09) 
0.186* 
(0.1) 
BALANCE 0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.014*** 
(0.003) 
0.017*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
0.019*** 
(0.004) 
LOGGDPCOV  -0.1* 
(0.05) 
-0.13** 
(0.06) 
-0.16* 
(0.06) 
-0.18*** 
(0.06) 
INTRATECOV   -0.013** 
(0.006) 
-0.0137** 
(0.006) 
-0.014** 
(0.006) 
EXCHRATECOV    0.06 
(0.14) 
0.13 
(0.15) 
EXCHRATECOVEMU    -0.003 
(0.23) 
-0.07 
(0.23) 
POLINSTAB     -0.026* 
(0.013) 
N. Obs. 319 319 314 293 293 
N. Groups 57 57 57 53 53 
R2 0.29 0.29 0.30 0.28 0.25 
Notes: All columns report coefficient estimates based on FE. Column (5) corresponds to the specification 
described in equation (1).  
 *** significance at the 1% level   **significance at the 5% level    *significance at the 10% level 
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Table 3. 
         2SLS – FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
LOGGDPt-2 -0.22 
(0.17) 
-0.25 
(0.18) 
-0.15 
(0.18) 
-0.18 
(0.19) 
-0.41 
(0.26) 
LOGGDPHI
 t-2 0.57*** 
(0.18) 
0.47*** 
(0.173) 
0.44** 
(0.17) 
0.44** 
(0.18) 
0.51*** 
(0.17) 
GOVERR&D
 t-2 0.64* 
(0.34) 
0.73** 
(0.35) 
0.75** 
(0.35) 
0.79** 
(0.38) 
0.82** 
(0.37) 
INTRATE -0.005* 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
  -0.006** 
(0.002) 
    -0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.007** 
(0.002) 
INTRATE2 0.00004** 
(0.00002) 
0.00006*** 
(0.00002) 
0.00007*** 
(0.00002) 
0.00008*** 
(0.00002) 
0.00007*** 
(0.00002) 
EXCHRATE -0.00008 
(0.0001) 
-0.00006 
(0.0001) 
-0.00005 
(0.0001) 
-0.00006 
(0.0001) 
-0.00005 
(0.0001) 
EXCHRATEEMU -0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.016 
(0.03) 
-0.006 
(0.03) 
0.0004 
(0.05) 
0.007 
(0.04) 
TRADEOPEN 0.097 
(0.07) 
0.16* 
(0.08) 
0.15* 
(0.08) 
0.213** 
(0.094) 
0.23** 
(0.09) 
BALANCE 0.015** 
(0.006) 
0.016*** 
(0.006) 
0.019*** 
(0.006) 
0.02*** 
(0.007) 
0.021*** 
(0.007) 
LOGGDPCOV  -0.13** 
(0.05) 
-0.175*** 
(0.06) 
-0.206*** 
(0.06) 
-0.21*** 
(0.065) 
INTRATECOV   -0.011*** 
(0.004) 
-0.011*** 
(0.004) 
-0.012*** 
(0.004) 
EXCHRATECOV    0.1 
(0.136) 
0.13 
(0.13) 
EXCHRATECOVEMU    -0.013 
(0.18) 
-0.034 
(0.17) 
POLINSTAB     -0.027* 
(0.016) 
N. Obs. 313 313 307 288 288 
N. Groups 51 51 50 48 48 
R2 0.30 0.31 0.32 0.34 0.346 
Notes: All columns report coefficient estimates based on 2SLS-FE. Column (5) corresponds to the 
specification described in equation (1).  
*** significance at the 1% level   **significance at the 5% level    *significance at the 10% level 
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Table 4. 
                               2SLS – FE 
 (1) (2) (3) 
LOGGDP
 t-2 -0.57** 
(0.25) 
-0.52** 
(0.26) 
0.18 
(0.2) 
LOGGDPHI
 t-2 0.6*** 
(0.17) 
0.47** 
(0.2) 
 
GOVERR&D
 t-2 0.7** 
(0.35) 
0.82** 
(0.4) 
0.8*** 
(0.13) 
INTRATE -0.006** 
(0.002) 
-0.006** 
(0.002) 
0.07** 
(0.02) 
INTRATE2 0.00008*** 
(0.00003) 
0.00008*** 
(0.00003) 
-0.005*** 
(0.001) 
EXCHRATE 0.000 
(0.03) 
-0.00001 
(0.00007) 
0.0003** 
(0.00008) 
EXCHRATEEMU -0.01 
(0.03) 
-0.04 
(0.05) 
-0.002 
(0.15) 
TRADEOPEN 0.16** 
(0.08) 
0.3*** 
(0.1) 
 
BALANCE 0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.02*** 
(0.006) 
0.004 
(0.005) 
LOGGDPCOV  -0.27*** 
(0.07) 
0.22* 
(0.14) 
INTRATECOV  -0.1*** 
(0.004) 
-0.023*** 
(0.008) 
EXCHRATECOV  0.2 
(0.14) 
-0.3 
(0.27) 
EXCHRATECOVEMU  -0.12 
(0.2) 
0.23 
(0.7) 
POLINSTAB -0.03** 
(0.01) 
-0.03* 
(0.16) 
 
XCONST   0.1 
(0.01) 
LOGGDPSTDEV -0.017*** 
             (0.6) 
  
 
INTRATESTDEV             -0.005* 
             (0.003) 
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EXCHRATESTDEV            -0.001** 
(0.0004) 
  
 
EXCHRATESTDEVEMU   0.007 
(0.0005) 
  
DEMOCRACY  0.001 
(0.01) 
 
PROPERTY RIGHTS
 
 
 0.007 
(0.01) 
 
HIGHTECHEXP
 t-2  0.006 
(0.005) 
 
N. Obs. 308 280 336 
N. Groups 30 48 22 
R2 0.35 0.34 0.89 
Notes: All columns report coefficient estimates based on 2SLS-FE. Column (5) corresponds to the 
specification described in equation (1).  
*** significance at the 1% level   **significance at the 5% level    *significance at the 10% level 
 
